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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtor borrowed money to purchase farm
land on which the debtor lived. The debtor executed mortgages to
secure the loans but the mortgages did not include language
required by Iowa Code § 561.22 for the waiver of homestead
exemption rights. The debtor claimed the property as a homestead
exemption in a bankruptcy proceeding and the bank sought to
enforce the mortgage against the property. The court held that the
failure of the mortgages to contain the language required by Iowa
Code § 561.22 prevented the bank from asserting any waiver of
the homestead exemption. In re Wagner, 259 B.R. 694 (Bankr.
8th Cir. 2001).
CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
The current extension of Chapter 12 expired on May 31,
2001.
RESIGNATION OF TRUSTEE . The court received a notice
that the U.S. Trustee had accepted the resignation of the standing
Chapter 12 trustee for the court’s district. The UST did not file the
letter with the court or provide any notice to the court, parties or
attorneys involved in current Chapter 12 cases. The UST argued
that, because the UST had the power to appoint the standing
trustee and to appoint a successor trustee, the UST had the
authority to remove the standing trustee. The court held that the
standing trustee could be removed only after notice and a hearing
as required by Section 324 and that the UST’s powers did not
include the power to remove the standing trustee without court
approval. In re Brookover, 259 B.R. 884 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
2001).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE . The debtor filed for Chapter 13 in February
2000 and the claims included taxes for 1993 which were assessed
in 1998. The debtor had filed two previous bankruptcy petitions,
in June 1997 and September 1998, both of which prevented
collection by the IRS. The IRS argued that the previous
bankruptcy cases tolled the 240 day provision in Section
507(a)(8)(A)(ii) to make the taxes nondischargeable. The court
found that the debtor had not filed the previous bankruptcy
petitions in order to intentionally use up the 240 days; however,
the court held that the 240 day limitation was equitably tolled
because the IRS was allowed only 108 days to collect the assessed
taxes. In re Hoppe, 259 B.R. 852 (Bankr. E.D. Tax. 2001).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
FARM CREDIT SYSTEM . The FCA has adopted as final
regulations which expanded the eligible borrowers and use of loan
proceeds to farmers, ranchers, aquatic producers and harvesters,
processing and  marketing operators, farm-related businesses,
rural homeowners, cooperatives and rural utilities. The previous
regulations were challenged in In ependent Bankers Ass'n of Am.
v. Farm Credit Admin., 986 F. Supp. 633 (D. D.C. 1997), rev’g,
164 F.3d 661 (D.C. Cir., 1999) as too broad because (1) the loans
could be made to rural homeowners who did not reside in the
rural home and (2) the regulations did not specifically limit FCS
banks and associations that extend long-term mortgage credit to
financing necessary capital structures, equipment, and initial
working capital for eligible farm-related service businesses. The
final regulations amend the original regulations to conform with
the two rulings. 66 Fed. Reg. 28641 (May 24, 2001).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
EQUITABLE RECOUPMENT . The taxpayer had made gifts
in several years and filed gift tax returns for the gifts. The amount
f gift tax assessed and paid was less than the amount actually
du because the IRS failed to account for previous gifts. By the
time the d cedent died, the statute of limitations on the gift tax for
several years had elapsed. The estate claimed the “gift tax
payable” for the gifts at the correct amount, i.e. the estate claimed
a credit for more gift tax than was actually paid. In a field service
advice lett r, the IRS determined that it could not use the doctrine
of equitable recoupment to reduce the “gift tax payable” to the
amount of ift tax actually paid. The IRS reasoned that (1) the
doctrine was available only as a defense against an otherwise
valid tax claim by the IRS and (2) the Tax Court did not have
sufficient equitable powers to use the doctrine. FSA Ltr. Rul.
200118002, Dec. 15, 2000.
GIFT .  The decedent had created a revocable trust for the
decedent’s life, with a remainder to various heirs. The decedent
subsequently married and created an irrevocable trust for the
spouse which was conditioned upon funding and qualification of
the trust as QTIP. If the irrevocable trust was not fully
established, the corpus reverted to the revocable trust established
earlier. The decedent failed to timely file an election to treat the
irrevocable trust as QTIP. The decedent’s estate filed an action in
state court which determined that the transfer to the irrevocable
trust was not completed; therefore, no gift occurred. The court
noted that the state court judgment was not given full weight but
held that the irrevocable trust was conditioned upon requirements
which were not met by the time of the decedent’s death; therefore,
no gift was completed for federal gift tax purposes. First Security
Bank v. United States, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,406
(D. N.M. 2001).
NET OPERATING LOSSES. The decedent was involved in a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy case at the time of death. The decedent
had net operating losses which passed to the estate and which
were offset by discharge of indebtedness occurring during the
bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy estate also incurred net
operating losses. The bankruptcy case terminated after the death
of the decedent. The decedent’s spouse filed a joint return for the
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year of the decedent’s death and the issue was whether the spouse
could claim on the joint return the net operating losses which
passed to the decedent at the close of the bankruptcy case. In a
field service advice letter, the IRS ruled that the net operating
losses did not belong to the decedent at the decedent’s death;
therefore, the decedent did not have any losses to include in the
joint return, which covered the spouse’s entire tax year but only
the decedent’s year up to the date of death. The IRS ruled that the
net operating losses were passed from the bankruptcy estate to the
decedent’s estate and would be included in the decedent’s estate’s
income tax return. FSA Ltr. Rul. 200118003, Dec. 26, 2000.
VALUATION OF STOCK . The decedent owned 18 of the
outstanding 76.445 shares of the voting stock and 3,942.048 of
the outstanding 141,288.584 shares of the nonvoting stock of a
private, family-owned corporation. The remaining shares of
outstanding voting stock were owned by the decedent's three
siblings. The voting stock was subject to a 360-day restriction on
transferability or hypothecation. Both classes of stock were
entitled to the same dividends on a per-share basis, if and when
dividends were declared. Holders of the nonvoting stock were
entitled to a liquidating preference. The Tax Court valued the
stock by calculating the equity value of the corporation, adding a
premium for voting privileges, and applying a 35-percent
marketability discount to the voting stock and a 40-percent
marketability discount to the nonvoting stock. The appellate court
reversed as to the valuation of the voting stock, holding that the
premium added for the voting stock was not based on any
economic value to the decedent or any potential buyer.  Est. of
Simplot v. Comm’r, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,405 (9th
Cir. 2001), rev’g in part, 112 T.C. 130 (1999).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBTS. The taxpayer was an attorney who owned a joint
tenancy interest in a family corporation which operated a small
retail store. The taxpayer provided some management assistance
but received no income from the corporation. The corporation
ceased business in 1993. The taxpayer made several loans to the
corporation and deducted the amount of the loans as a bad debt in
1993. The taxpayer also paid some of the business expenses in
1993 and claimed those payments as a business expense
deduction in 1993. The court held that the taxpayer was not
entitled to a business bad debt deduction because the taxpayer
was not in the lending business nor the retail business but made
the loans as shareholders or family members. The court also
denied the business expense deduction because the expenses were
liabilities of the corporation. Martens v. Comm’r, 2001-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,416 (5th Cir. 2001), aff’g T.C. Memo.
2000-46.
CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02.*
REASONABLE COMPENSATION. The taxpayer was an S
corporation with one shareholder. Although the shareholder had
been responsible for the taxpayer’s early success, the shareholder
had been in failing health during the tax years involved and most
of the income came from passive investments. The shareholder
received compensation equal to 81 and 88 percent of the
taxpayer’s adjusted taxable income and the court held that this
was unreasonable because the shareholder’s efforts were no
longer essential to the production of income. Metro Leasing &
Development Corp. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-119.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM § 4.02[14].
The U.S. Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the following
case. The taxpayer had received severance pay based on the
taxpayer’s salary and length of service with the employer. The
t xpayer excluded the payments from income, arguing that the
taxpayer received physical injury from the early termination of
employment and the employer knew about the injury when the
paym n s were made. The court held, in an opinion designated as
not for publication, that the payments were included in income
because the payments were based on the taxpayer’s salary and
length of service and were not made as compensation for the
injuries. C ok v. United States, 2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,770 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied., ___ S. Ct. ___ (2001).
The taxpayers received a jury award and accrued interest in a
personal i jury action. A portion of the award was paid to the
axpayers’ attorneys under a contingent fee contract. The
taxpayers excluded the attorney fees from their reported gross
income. The court held that the attorneys’ fees were properly
exclu ed from income because the fees would be taxable to the
attorneys. The court cited Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202
F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000) in support of its holding. The case is
designated as not for publication. Brisco v. United States, 2001-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,420 (6th Cir. 2001).
The taxpayer was employed for several years by a drugstore
chain. The taxpayer experienced various physical and mental
problems from the strain of working long  hours and irregular
hours. A class action suit was filed by other parties against the
drugstore chain for unpaid overtime compensation. The taxpayer
joined in the suit as a class member but did not assert any claims
for physical or mental injuries. The drugstore agreed to a
monetary settlement and the settlement did not indicate that the
taxpayer’s payment was for personal injuries. The taxpayer
excluded the settlement payment from income as a payment for
personal injuries. The court held that the payment was included in
income because the class action petition made no mention of
claims for personal injuries but sought damages only for unpaid
compensation. Hamblin v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-
73.
The decedent and family had filed a suit against various
sheetrock manufacturers for injury to the decedent from asbestos.
The parties reached a settlement which stated that a portion of the
settlement was for the survival action, a portion for the wrongful
death action, and a portion for the loss of consortium claim. The
IRS ruled that the entire settlement was excludible from taxable
income because all the claims were based on the physical injuries
suffered by the decedent. Ltr. Rul. 200121031, Feb. 16, 2001.
DISASTER PAYMENTS . On April 27, 2001, the President
determined that certain areas in Kansas were eligible for
assistance under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, as a result of severe storms, hail, tornadoes
and flooding beginning on April 21, 2001. FEMA-1366-DR. On
May 9, 2001, the President determined that certain areas in
Illinois were eligible for assistance under the Act as a result of
flooding beginning on April 18, 2001. FEMA-1368-DR. On May
16, 2001, the President determined that certain areas in Maine
were eligible for assistance under the Act as a result of flooding
on March 5-31, 2001. FEMA-1371-DR. On May 16, 2001, the
President determined that certain areas in Minnesota were eligible
for assistance under the Act as a result of severe winter storms,
flooding and tornadoes beginning on March 23, 2001. FEMA-
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1370-DR. On May 16, 2001, the President determined that certain
areas in Nebraska were eligible for assistance under the Act as a
result of severe storms, flooding and tornadoes on April 10-23,
2001. FEMA-1373-DR. On May 16, 2001, the President
determined that certain areas in Puerto Rico were eligible for
assistance under the Act as a result of severe storms, flooding and
mudslides beginning on May 6, 2001. FEMA-1372-DR. On May
11, 2001, the President determined that certain areas in Wisconsin
were eligible for assistance under the Act as a result of severe
storms and flooding on April 10, 2001. FEMA-1369-DR.
Accordingly, a taxpayer who sustained a loss attributable to the
disasters may deduct the loss on his or her 2000 federal income
tax return.
EARNED INCOME CREDIT. In a Chief Counsel Advice
letter, the IRS discussed whether rental income was qualified
income for earned income credit purposes where (1) unimproved
land was leased to an unrelated party and (2) improved land was
leased to a partnership in which the taxpayer was a partner. The
IRS stated that, under I.R.C. § 32(i)(2)(C), EIC qualified income
must come from the ordinary course of a trade or business and,
under I.R.C. § 32(i)(2)(E), cannot be passive activity income as
defined by I.R.C. § 469. The IRS ruled that, under both situations,
the rental income was derived from the ordinary course of a trade
or business. In addition, the IRS ruled that the rental income in
the first situation was not qualified for EIC because the income
was considered income from a passive activity under I.R.C. §
469.  The main issue was whether, in the second situation, the
self-rental recharacterization rule of I.R.C. § 469 applied for the
purposes of EIC. Under the recharacterization rules, otherwise
passive rental income from property leased to a related entity in
which the lessor materially participates is recharacterized as
nonpassive under I.R.C. § 469. The IRS ruled that the
recharacterization rule did not affect the EIC definition of
nonpassive activity because the recharacterization rule applied
only to transform the income into nonpassive income and did not
affect the definition of the passive activity. Thus, the IRS ruled
that the rental income from the second situation was not qualified
for EIC because the income came from a passive activity. See also
Harl, “Recharacterization of Income: Treacherous Rules,” 11
Agric. L. Dig. 33 (2000). CCA Ltr. Rul. 20012037, March 30,
2001.
A similar ruling concerned a lease of improved real property to
a C corporation wholly-owned by the lessor. In a Chief Counsel
Advice letter, the IRS ruled that the rental income from the
second situation was not qualified for EIC because the income
came from a passive activity.  As with the above ruling, the IRS
ruled that the recharacterization rule did not apply to change the
passive rental income activity into a nonpassive activity. CCA
Ltr. Rul. 200120036, March 28, 2001.
HOME OFFICE . The taxpayer was a clinical psychologist
who was employed by a clinic for at least eight hours each day.
The taxpayer also provided counseling services at the taxpayer’s
own office. The taxpayer lived in a small apartment and used an
area in the entryway for scheduling appointments by phone call
for the taxpayer’s private practice. The taxpayer also stored the
business records in the apartment but did not meet any clients
there. The court held that the taxpayer could not deduct any home
office expenses relating to the costs of the apartment. Mullin v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-121.
The taxpayer was the sole shareholder of an S corporation and
leased a portion of the taxpayer’s residence to the corporation for
use in its business. The taxpayer used this leased portion of the
resid nce to carry on the business of the corporation. In a Chief
Counsel Advice letter, the IRS ruled that the taxpayer could claim
deductions for the leased portion for mortgage interest, real
property taxes and personal casualty losses; however, I.R.C. §
280A(c)(6) prevented any deductions under I.R.C. §§ 162,
165(c)(1) 167 for business expenses, business casualty losses or
depreciation for the leased portion of the residence. CCA Ltr.
Rul. 200121070, March 19, 2001.
INTEREST . The taxpayer had obtained several student loans in
obtaining a Ph. D. in psychology and was making payments on
those l ans. The court held that the taxpayer could not deduct the
interest paid on the loans as a business deduction. Mullin v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-121.
LOSSES. The taxpayer owned several related small
corporations. The IRS assessed a deficiency against the taxpayer
in 1987 and executed a levy at the taxpayer’s business operated
by one corporation. The taxpayer claimed a loss deduction for the
value of the taxpayer’s labor to the corporation which was lost
due to the execution of the levy. The court held that the taxpayer
could not claim a loss deduction for the loss of the taxpayer’s
labor because the taxpayer had no tax basis in the labor. Tonn v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-123.
PENALTIE S. The IRS has issued a revenue procedure to
inform taxpayers how to request an administrative appeal of the
penalties imposed by I.R.C. § 6715 relating to the misuse of dyed
diesel fuel and kerosene and I.R.C. §§ 4083(c)(3), 7342 relating
to the refusal to admit entry for purposes of inspecting facilities
and equipment and taking and removing fuel samples. Rev. Proc.
2001-33, I.R.B. 2001-__.
RETURNS. The IRS has issued specifications for the
submission of Forms 1098, 1099, 5498, and W-2G magnetically
or electronically using magnetic tape, tape cartridges, or diskettes,
or electronically through the IRS FIRE System. These guidelines
govern the preparation of tax year 2001 information returns and
information returns for tax years prior to 2001 that are required to
be filed. The specifications are to be used to prepare current and
prior year information returns filed beginning January 1, 2002,
and received by the IRS Martinsburg Computing Center or
postmarked by December 15, 2002. Rev. Proc. 2001-32, I.R.B.
2001-21.
The IRS has released an April 2001 revision of Publication 538,
Accounting Periods and Methods and Form 8851 (2001),
Summary of Archer MSAs. These documents are available at no
charge (1) by calling the IRS's toll-free telephone number, 1-800-
829-3676; (2) through FedWorld; (3) via the internet at
http://www.irs.gov/prod/cover.html; or (4) by directly accessing
the Internal Revenue Information Services bulletin board at (703)
321-8020.
The IRS has requested comments regarding Form 4835, Farm
Rental Income and Expenses. The form is used by landowners or
sublessors to report farm income based on crops or livestock
produced by a tenant when the landowner or sublessor does not
materially participate in the operation or management of the farm.
Written comments should be submitted on or before July 20,
2001, to Garrick R. Shear, IRS, Room 5244, 1111 Constitution
Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20224.
The plaintiff was hired by the defendant and during the
processing  stage  of  the  hiring,  the  plaintiff  requested  that  the
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defendant not use the plaintiff’s social security number (SSN)
on the employment records. The plaintiff objected to the use of
the SSN on religious grounds. The defendant fired the plaintiff
as a result of the defendant’s refusal to use a substitute number.
The plaintiff sought an injunction and reinstatement, arguing
that the termination for refusal to use the SSN violated the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The court assumed that the plaintiff’s
religious objection was bona fide and that the plaintiff’s
employment was terminated solely because of the plaintiff’s
refusal to allow the use of the SSN. The court held that the
termination did not violate the Act because the termination
resulted from the federal law requirement that an employer
report withholding taxes using an employee’s SSN. Baltgalvis
v. Newport News Shipbuilding Inc., 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,408 (E. D. Va. 2001).
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayer sold a residence on
April 25, 1997 and failed to purchase a new home within two
years so as to qualify for rollover of the gain from the sale of
the first home. In 1997, the Congress amended the law for gain
from the sale of a home to exclude up to $250,000 of gain but
made the new law retroactive only to May 7, 1997. The
taxpayer challenged the constitutionality of the retroactive date,
arguing that the law should have been made retroactive to
January 1, 1997 because the new law was being considered
then. The court held that the choice of May 7, 1997 as the
retroactive date of the new law was not unconstitutional
because it served a legitimate congressional purpose. Buerer v.
United States, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,424 (W.D.
N.C. 2001).
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS . The taxpayer received
social security benefits because of a medical condition and
excluded the benefits from income. The taxpayer argued that
the benefits were nontaxable as health and accident insurance
benefits under I.R.C. §§ 104(a)(3), 105(e). The court held that
the social security disability payments were included in taxable
income. The court noted that a provision excluding social
security disability benefits from income was repealed in 1983,
strongly indicating Congressional intent that social security
benefits were taxable. The taxpayer also argued that the
taxation of social security benefits violated the equal protection
clause of the U.S. Constitution because other disability
payments were not taxable. The court cited several cases which
supported the holding that the taxation of social security
benefits was constitutional. Thomas v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2001-120.
* * * *
The Agricultural Law Press presents
2001 AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINARS
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
  June 19-22, 2001  Ramada Conference Center, Columbia, MO
(still room available-call for last-minute registrations)
  July 31, August 1-3, 2001  Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle, PA
  October 2-5, 2001  Interstate Holiday Inn, Grand Island, NE
Come join us for expert and practical seminars on the
essential aspects of agricultural tax and law. Gain insight and
understanding from two of the nation’s top agricultural tax and
law instructors.
Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
• Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
of 2001
• Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in
respect of decedent, installment sales, private annuities, self-
canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
• Taxation of debt, taxation of bankruptcy, the latest on SE
tax of rental of land to a family-owned entity; income
averaging; earned income credit; commodity futures
transactions; paying wages in kind.
• Farm estate planning, including 15-year installment
payment of federal estate tax, co-ownership discounts,
alternate valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned
business deduction (FOBD), marital deduction planning,
disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of both
spouses, trusts, and generation skipping transfer tax.
• Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future
interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
• Organizing the farm business--one entity or two,
corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited
liability companies.
• Legal developments in farm contracts, secured transactions,
bankruptcy, real property, water law, torts, and environmental
law.
   More information and a registration form are available online
at www.agrilawpress.com, or call Robert Achenbach at 1-
541-302-1958, or e-mail to robert@agrilawpress.com
